# BinRec: Attack Surface Reduction Through Dynamic Binary Recovery


<u>Taddeus Kroes</u>, Anil Altinay, Joseph Nash, Yeoul Na, Stijn Volckaert, Herbert Bos, Michael Franz, Cristiano Giuffrida

October 19, 2018





```
x = getenv("SET_ME");
if (x)
    cold_code();
hot_code();
```



setme\_str: .asciz: "SET\_ME"
push setme\_str
call getenv
cmp-eax, 0
je main

call cold\_code


main:

call hot\_code


#### Static approach




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
#### Static approach




#### Dynamic approach by BinRec




#### Dynamic approach by BinRec




#### Dynamic approach by BinRec





#### BinRec goal: complex binary transformation





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




























What about unlifted code paths?


```
if (getenv("SET_ME")) {
    puts("thanks!"); // not recovered!
}
```




```
getenv("SET_ME");
```


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
...







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


IR interacts with VM runtime




IR interacts with VM runtime


// machine code 0x1000: add ebx, 1 jmp 0x1234	<pre>// Lifted code emit_event(BASIC_BLOCK_START) cpu_state.pc = 0x1000 ebx = &amp;cpu_state.registers[R_EBX] *ebx = *ebx + 1</pre>
	<pu_state.icount++< pre=""></pu_state.icount++<>
	cpu_state.pc = 0x1234
	<pre>emit_event(BASIC_BLOCK_END)</pre>




<pre>// machine code 0x1000: add ebx, 1 jmp 0x1234</pre>	<pre>// Lifted code emit_event(BASIC_BLOCK_START) cpu_state.pc = 0x1000 ebx = &amp;cpu_state.registers[R_EBX] events, counters *ebx = *ebx + 1 cpu_state.icount++ cpu_state.pc = 0x1234</pre>
	<pre>cpu_state.pc = 0x1234 emit_event(BASIC_BLOCK_END)</pre>



<pre>// machine code 0x1000: add ebx, 1 jmp 0x1234</pre>	<pre>// Lifted code emit_event(BASIC_BLOCK_START) cpu_state.pc = 0x1000 ebx = &amp;cpu_state.registers[R_EBX] *ebx = *ebx + 1 cpu_state.icount++ cpu_state.pc = 0x1234</pre>	control flow through virtual program counter registers in CPU state
	emit_event(BASIC_BLOCK_END)	




// machine code 0x1000: add ebx, 1 jmp 0x1234	<pre>// Lifted code emit_event(BASIC_BLOCK_START) cpu_state.pc = 0x1000 ebx = &amp;cpu_state.registers[R_EBX] *ebx = *ebx + 1 cpu_state.icount++ cpu_state.pc = 0x1234</pre>	<pre>// stripped code global ebx lifted_1000: ebx = ebx + 1 goto lifted_1234</pre>
	<pre>emit_event(BASIC_BLOCK_END)</pre>	




#### This is quite bit of code


#### Implementation




## Implementation




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
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



## Case study





```
// ab.c
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    char a = argv[1][0];
    char b = argv[1][1];
    if (a == 'a') {
        if (b == 'b') {
            puts("You entered \"ab\"");
        }
    }
    return 0;
}
```















Raw code is heavily instrumented


- event triggers
- instruction counter
- program counter, registers, flags, etc. stored in CPU state in memory




















.text	
	• • •


Recovered code






Old binary + Recovered code = Recovered binary






Old binary + Recovered code = Recovered binary



#### Recovered LLVM



# Experiments

## Experiments

- Correctness
- Attack Surface Reduction: ROP gadgets
- Performance

#### Experiment: correctness

Do our transformations preserve semantics?

- Yield errors for unknown code paths
- Check that recovered binary has same output as input binary

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Do our transformations preserve semantics?

- Yield errors for unknown code paths
- Check that recovered binary has same output as input binary

24 input binaries from SPEC-CPU2006 (x86)

- 15 succeeded, 9 failed (unexpected fallback / crash)

# Experiment: ROP gadget reduction


Is the attack surface actually smaller?

- 72% fewer instructions
- 48% fewer ROP gadgets

(both numbers are geomean)


## **Experiment:** performance

- -03 input binaries: expect similar performance
- -00 input binaries: expect speedup
- Disable fallback errors: maybe expect speedup



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## Wish list / future work

- Gadget-aware compiler backend
- Improve performance
  - Do aggressive profile-guided optimization
- Deobfuscation

### Conclusion

- BinRec successfully transforms binaries at compiler IR level
- ... and halves the ROP attack surface in the process

Also

- Binary lifting is hard



