

Rain: Transiently Leaking Data from Public Clouds Using Old Vulnerabilities

Mathé Hertogh*, Dave Quakkelaar*, Thijs Raymakers*, Mahesh Hari Sarma*,
Marius Muench**, Herbert Bos*, Erik van der Kouwe*
*Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, **University of Birmingham

Abstract—Given their vital importance for governments and enterprises around the world, we need to trust public clouds to provide strong security guarantees even in the face of advanced attacks and hardware vulnerabilities. While transient execution vulnerabilities, such as Spectre, have been in the spotlight since 2018, until now there have been no reports of realistic attacks on real-world clouds, leading to an assumption that such attacks are not practical in noisy real-world settings and without knowledge about the (host or guest) victim. In particular, given that today’s clouds have large fleets of older CPUs that lack comprehensive, in-silicon fixes to a variety of transient execution vulnerabilities, the question arises whether sufficient software-based defenses have been deployed to stop realistic attacks—especially those using older, supposedly mitigated vulnerabilities.

In this paper, we answer this question in the negative. We show that the practice of mitigating vulnerabilities in isolation, without removing the root cause, leaves systems vulnerable. By combining such “mitigated” (and by themselves harmless) vulnerabilities, attackers may still craft an end-to-end attack that is more than the sum of its parts. In particular, we show that attackers can use L1TF, one of the oldest known transient execution vulnerabilities (discovered in January 2018), in combination with a simple speculative out-of-bounds load, to leak data from other guests in a commercial cloud computing platform. Moreover, with an average end-to-end duration of 15 hours to leak the TLS key of an Nginx server in a victim VM under noisy conditions, without detailed knowledge of either host or guest, the attack is realistic even in one of today’s biggest and most important commercial clouds.

1. Introduction

As governments and enterprises around the world rely on proprietary public clouds for on-demand access to scalable computing, today’s clouds have become a foundational component of our digital infrastructure. Since all multi-tenant cloud solutions imply that users may share physical resources with untrusted other tenants, they require implicit trust in the security guarantees of the underlying hardware and system software to keep data safe from adversarial co-tenants. Providing such guarantees is challenging, especially in the presence of the ever-expanding arsenal of transient-execution and side-channel exploits [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. While mitigations exist for

each of these vulnerabilities, even for older and vulnerable hardware, they are often incomplete, especially as deployed. The reason is that comprehensive mitigation of transient execution vulnerabilities such as Spectre [1], L1TF [7], [13], and MDS [8], [9], [10] is very expensive [14]. Not surprisingly, industry deploys ‘spot’ mitigations instead—rendering the vulnerability too difficult to exploit using known techniques, but without removing the root cause.

Even so, there have been no reports of realistic attacks on real-world clouds with any of the older vulnerabilities. It appears as if the collection of mitigations put in place by cloud providers is sufficient to stop exploitation of these vulnerabilities in practice [15]. Indeed, some consider these attacks so complicated that it is questionable if they form a practical threat [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]. While new vulnerabilities still create media attention [21], [22] and often remain under embargo while mitigations are deployed [23], there is little concern about older vulnerabilities such as L1TF [7], [13] (discovered in January 2018).

In this paper, we question this lack of concern and show not only that practical attacks on modern clouds are possible, but that they are possible with vulnerabilities we considered mitigated 7 years ago. In particular, we use L1TF together with a speculative out-of-bounds load to overcome all relevant security measures and leak sensitive data from the hypervisor and even a co-tenant on the Google cloud. While others have argued that combining L1TF and half-Spectre was possible [24], [25], and some used synthetic gadgets in proof-of-concepts [26], we show that more than a theoretical possibility, this is a real-world threat in popular clouds. Using a novel technique based on pointer chasing through the host and guest, we leak all information required to manually perform two-dimensional page table walks (i.e., through the guest’s page tables and extended page tables) in software; with this, we can translate arbitrary virtual guest addresses to host physical addresses, enabling the leakage of any byte in the memory of the victim via L1TF.

Our leakage primitive also works on the Amazon cloud, but defenses in depth restrict leakage to non-sensitive host data. The attack assumes no knowledge of the software running on the victim, nor does it assume a prior leakage of the randomized address space layouts, and it is effective even in the presence of realistic noise. Our research provides further evidence that the common practice of mitigating a vulnerability in isolation is not sufficient if it fails to remove the root cause, as attackers may combine issues that are

harmless in isolation to craft an end-to-end attack that is more than the sum of its parts.

We demonstrate our attack on KVM-based hypervisors, and believe the approach applies to other hypervisors as well. In particular, we evaluate the attack in three types of cloud environments that run on CPUs where L1TF was mitigated in software: a local system running base KVM, Google Cloud Engine (GCE) instances of type N1 [27], and Amazon Web Services (AWS) instances of type C5 [28]. On base KVM and GCE instances, we successfully extracted sensitive data, such as the TLS key from an Nginx server running on a guest VM. On AWS cloud instances, we were able to leak non-sensitive information from the host, but not any data from guest VMs, due to defenses in depth in the hypervisor that unmap sensitive guest data from it. Our attack explicitly detects whether it is running on an L1TF-vulnerable CPU. It is also stealthy: we are not aware of any mechanisms that reliably allow a hypervisor to detect our attack, and both AWS and Google reported that their production fleets’ monitoring systems did not detect any of our exploitation efforts.¹

We summarize our contributions as follows:

- We show transient execution attacks: (a) are *practical* to leak sensitive data in *real-world clouds*, (b) using some of the *oldest vulnerabilities* available, and (c) *without prior knowledge* of the victims.
- We demonstrate that spot mitigations of transient execution vulnerabilities are not sufficient, as the combined exploitation of vulnerabilities deemed harmless individually can lead to high-impact attacks.
- We describe a novel attack technique based on aggressive pointer chasing and software-controlled two-dimensional page table walks to leak any byte in a VM running on the same host system.
- We showcase our findings by launching L1TF Reloaded, an end-to-end guest-to-guest attack on proprietary cloud environments and successfully leak cryptographic data from a victim VM in the Google cloud.

Ethical Considerations. To avoid any negative impact on the targeted cloud providers or any of their customers, we took the necessary precautions. All of our exploitation efforts were conducted on dedicated hosts, i.e., sole-tenant machines, in the respective provider’s fleet. This ensured that only our *own* VMs ran on one physical machine, hence no other customer data was ever at risk. Both AWS and Google were fully aware of our research, and we informed the parties of our attacks in advance (including which exact instances we were targeting and when), and performed them with their permission. This guaranteed exploitation occurred in real-world production environments with no risk to any of the cloud providers’ customers.

¹As we explain later, we did our research with explicit permission of the cloud providers, with safeguards to prevent leakage of third party data.

Realistic Attacker. The attack we demonstrate in this paper is realistic. We rented our VMs from the production fleets of AWS and Google by means of regular user accounts, via the same APIs as any ordinary cloud customer does. While we targeted only our own VMs on sole-tenant hosts, one can do the same for victim VMs on a multi-tenant host. AWS and Google confirmed that both types of machines use the same hardware and software stacks, only differing in their VM allocation policy; hence, any attack on a sole-tenant machine also applies to a multi-tenant machine.

In addition, we performed our attacks in a black-box fashion. Neither AWS nor Google provided us with any insider information, such as what host kernel is running (i.e., version, configuration, patches, etc.), or which mitigations were deployed. We thus never had any more access to the targeted systems than any ordinary cloud user would, including no access to the hypervisor or bare metal.

Coordinated Disclosure. Following coordinated disclosure practices, we officially notified AWS and Google about L1TF Reloaded in May 2025 and discussed possible mitigations with them. Later, we also notified other relevant parties, such as the Linux kernel maintainers, Intel, and other cloud providers, and publicly disclosed the issue in August 2025. Our patch to eliminate the exploited half-Spectre gadget has been mainlined by Linux [29], and has been deployed by AWS and Google. Moreover, Google deployed ASI as a more in-depth mitigation in response to L1TF Reloaded [30]. AWS confirmed that already deployed defense-in-depth mechanisms prevent us from leaking (other) guest memory [31]. Google agreed that L1TF Reloaded posed a direct threat to their customers, and awarded this research with a bounty of over \$150k as part of their Cloud Vulnerability Reward Program (VRP), the most that the Cloud VRP has ever given out. We strongly believe that this open attitude towards security is a good thing, and appreciate that AWS and Google actively stimulate security improvements by facilitating this type of research.

Artifact Availability. An artifact of this research, including exploit code, exploit demo video, noise workloads, and reproduction instructions is available at <https://github.com/vusec/rain>. Both AWS and Google used it to successfully reproduce our exploit on their respective clouds, independently confirming our results.

2. Background

2.1. Transient Execution Attacks

For optimization purposes, modern processors implement out-of-order and prediction-based speculative execution to perform operations before they are needed or before the CPU knows if it should perform them at all. Doing so may lead to undesired behavior when the prediction is wrong or the processor is unable to handle execution faults (e.g., illegal data accesses) immediately. While the CPU will detect these errors eventually and roll back all changes to

the architectural state (registers, memory), traces of such “transient execution” remain detectable in the microarchitectural state. For instance, data accessed by the transient instructions will now be in the cache. Moreover, if a memory access is secret dependent, attackers can often recover the secret data by means of a cache attack [32], [33], [34], [35]. Since the first disclosure of Meltdown [2] and Spectre [1] in 2018, researchers have discovered many new transient execution attacks [3], [4], [6], [7], [8], [9], [11], [13], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40].

2.2. L1 Terminal Fault

One of the earliest transient execution vulnerabilities, discovered in January 2018, is L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) [7], [13], [41], [42]. It allows unprivileged speculative access to data residing in the L1 data cache and affects Intel processors up to Coffee Lake [43]. The root cause of L1TF lies in the logic implementing “terminal faults”: upon translating a virtual address with an invalid Page Table Entry (PTE), translation terminates immediately, but the L1 data cache is still indexed with the physical address in the PTE. Upon an L1 hit, the memory access instruction gets served the referenced data speculatively, enabling leakage via side-channel techniques [32].

In a cloud attack scenario, a guest OS can purposefully mark a PTE invalid, leading the terminal fault to skip the Extended Page Table (EPT) walks that isolate VMs from host physical memory. In other words, the CPU interprets the *guest* physical address in the PTE as a *host* physical address, and indexes the L1 data cache with it. By putting any desired host physical address in the guest’s PTE, a VM gains speculative access to the corresponding data, as long as it resides in the L1 data cache. In short, L1TF provides a VM with the following leakage oracle: the VM picks a host physical address, and the CPU leaks the corresponding data if it resides in the L1 data cache, or leaks nothing otherwise.

2.3. Mitigating L1 Terminal Fault

To combat such exploits, Intel provides in-silicon mitigations for newer generations of CPUs, and microcode updates and software-based measures for older CPUs [41]. Fully mitigating L1TF data leakage in virtualized environments, however, requires disabling EPT—a measure so expensive that providers opt for more practical options [18].

In particular, cloud providers use the combination of L1D flushing [41], [44] and core scheduling [15], [45]. The former consists of flushing the L1 data cache upon VM-entry and prevents a VM from leaking left-over data from other security domains. In Linux this occurs either upon every VM-entry or conditionally [44] (i.e., only performing a flush upon VM-entry from “non audited” kernel code paths). However, flushing the cache alone does not suffice, as another VM or guest may run concurrently on another vCPU of the same physical core. To prevent this from occurring, we must also disable SMT, but this comes at a significant

	SMT on	Core-scheduling	Strict Core-scheduling	SMT off
No Flushing	$A+H+V$	$A+H+V$	$A+H+V$	$A+H+V$
Conditional	$A+H+V$	$A+H$	$A+H_a$	$A+H_a$
L1D Flushing	$A+H+V$	$A+H$	A	A

TABLE 1: For different flush and SMT configurations, what data remains leakable by an attacker VM? A : attacker VM’s own data, H : host data, H_a : audited host data, V : other (victim) VM data. Leaking an attacker VM’s own data might sound uninteresting, but this includes leaking its (normally hidden) location in host physical memory, which can help facilitate other exploitation methods (e.g., Rowhammer).

performance cost. Instead, security-minded systems combine flushing with core scheduling: ensuring that a VM is only scheduled on a core if the other VMs on the core are also trusted. Combined, these mitigations prevent guest-to-guest attacks. In principle, guest-to-host attacks are still possible, as the hypervisor can still run on the same physical core with any guest at any time. To explicitly address this, one would require *strict core-scheduling* [41], which additionally involves “stunning” sibling hyperthreads upon a VM-exit: while one hyperthread runs the hypervisor, all of its siblings must be idle, incurring major performance overhead. However, Linux kernel developers explicitly doubted the practical exploitability of the short vulnerable window for the guest-to-host attack [15].

To summarize, only in-silicon mitigations or disabling EPT fully stop L1TF data leakage. All the aforementioned software measures are, instead, spot mitigations that cannot stop an attacker from leaking data from the L1 data cache, only making sure that data from certain domains is not available in the cache for leakage. In Table 1, we show what data can still be leaked when using common L1D flushing-based mitigations.

2.4. Half-Spectre Gadgets

To launch a Spectre attack [1], an attacker steers speculative execution toward a particular code pattern, a so-called “gadget”, that discloses and transmits secret data via a microarchitectural side channel (e.g., a cache attack). For instance, the Spectre-v1 gadget in Listing 1 consists of an out-of-bounds memory access that loads some secret data, and a subsequent secret-dependent load that transmits said data, following a mispredicted conditional branch. To exploit this gadget, the attacker lets the branch execute many times with a value for index that satisfies the condition on Line 1 to ‘train’ the CPU to predict that the branch will be taken upon the next iteration. By subsequently providing a value for index that does not satisfy the condition, the CPU speculatively accesses a value outside the array bounds (Line 2) and then leaks the data using a memory dereference through B, before recognizing its mistake.

```

1  if (index < ARRAY_SIZE)
2    x = A[index]; // access secret during speculation
3    y = B[4096*x]; // transmission of secret
4
5  if (index < ARRAY_SIZE)
6    x = A[index]; // access secret during speculation

```

Listing 1: Top: a classic Spectre-v1 gadget. Bottom: a half-Spectre gadget, an incomplete Spectre-v1 gadget where the transmission of the secret is absent.

To mitigate Spectre, software developers aggressively remove such code patterns from their programs. However, what about incomplete gadgets, such as the bottom code fragment in Listing 1? This “half-Spectre” gadget (sometimes referred to a prefetch gadget in literature [46]) is exactly like the top one, but without the transmission part (Line 3). These are harmless by themselves, and are still very common. While attackers may still leak the secret accessed in Line 2 using other transient execution attacks such as MDS [8], [9], [10], these attacks have been comprehensively mitigated [47], so the risk was considered limited. However, recent work has shown that, in theory at least, half-Spectre gadgets are still usable in combination with other vulnerabilities to leak sensitive data [24], [26]. The question is whether the spot mitigations deployed in modern clouds are sufficient to stop such attacks in practice.

3. Threat Model

We consider a malicious VM in a realistic cloud environment (i.e., where the attacker rents their VM like an ordinary customer of the targeted cloud, and thus has the same capabilities), in the presence of co-located workloads. Attackers have root access to their own virtual machine and may perform hypercalls to interact with the hypervisor. We assume that the host system runs the latest microcode version and is up-to-date with regard to all (default) mitigations against transient execution attacks, including L1D flushing [41], [44] and core scheduling [15], [45]. In addition, we assume the presence of all default mitigations against traditional software exploitation, such as stack canaries, $W \oplus X$ and (K)ASLR. Further, we consider the attacker blind with respect not just to other guest VMs, but also to the host system, i.e., they do not have any in-depth knowledge of the (proprietary) hypervisor and the undocumented measures deployed against exploitation. The aim of our attacker is to perform a transient execution attack in order to leak sensitive data from the host and/or other VMs in the system.

4. Attack Overview

In this section, we provide an overview of L1TF Reloaded, in which an attacker combines L1TF with a half-Spectre gadget in the hypervisor to launch a guest-to-guest attack that achieves arbitrary data leakage from other guest VMs in the system.

L1TF mitigations such as L1D flushing and core scheduling prevent guest-to-guest attacks, but not guest-to-




Figure 1: L1TF Reloaded combines L1TF with half-Spectre. On one logical core, the attacker performs a hypercall to make the hypervisor execute a half-Spectre gadget and speculatively access out-of-bounds memory. This brings secret data into the L1 data cache, which the sibling logical core leaks using L1TF.

host attacks—although Linux kernel developers were initially doubtful about their practical exploitability [15]. In this paper, we instead demonstrate the practicality of the attack. By means of a controllable half-Spectre gadget in the hypervisor, we trick it into speculatively loading arbitrary system memory into the L1 data cache. We then use L1TF on the sibling core to leak the contents of the L1 data cache, despite all mitigations present against L1TF. Figure 1 conceptually illustrates this combined exploitation.

Our end-to-end attack consists of six phases: (1) local attack preparation, (2) cloud host profiling, (3) gadget base discovery, (4) host targeting, (5) guest targeting, and (6) data extraction. Given the sophisticated nature of the attack, we first give a high-level overview of each of the steps and defer the detailed explanation to Section 5. We display this high-level overview in Figure 2.

Local Attack Preparation. In this phase, we lay the ground work for our subsequent attack steps on our own machine. In particular, we prepare a guest VM that is optimized for L1TF leakage and scan a recent version of the target hypervisor for an exploitable half-Spectre gadget. While we do not know if the version of the hypervisor in the public cloud is the same, we assume that it will be similar. For instance, after discovering an exploitable half-Spectre gadget in KVM through local gadget analysis, we make the educated guess that this gadget also exists in the hypervisors in public clouds that are based on KVM. While any controllable transient load primitive will do, we assume in the remainder of this paper that the gadget accesses an element in an array with an offset that is controlled by the attacker.

Cloud Host Profiling. Next, we determine whether the host system provided by the targeted public cloud is vulnerable to our attack. We do so by first profiling the CPU, to see if our guest VM is likely running on a CPU that is vulnerable to




Figure 2: Overview of our attack strategy. After (1) preparing our attack locally and (2) checking whether our VM is likely running on a vulnerable CPU, we (3) find the physical address of the gadget’s base and use the host kernel’s direct map to establish an arbitrary host physical memory read primitive. Then, we (4) break KASLR by determining the start of the direct map, and by chasing kernel pointers in it locate the host’s root page table to enable the translation of all host virtual addresses to host physical addresses. Using this translation ability, we further chase pointers through kernel structures to (5) find the victim VM’s page tables and extended page tables, enabling virtual guest address to host physical address translation. With that, we can (6) chase arbitrary guest pointers to extract sensitive data from the victim VM guest.

L1TF. If so, we perform a number of experiments that detect the mitigations that the host enables against L1TF, and check whether they impede our attack. If all indicators suggest that the host is vulnerable, we commence our exploit.

Gadget Base Discovery. Given the half-Spectre gadget in the hypervisor, we define x as the attacker-controllable offset used by the gadget to access an array element. We first consider the gadget’s base—the address corresponding to offset zero of the array. This is an unknown virtual address v . Since we can only use L1TF to leak data from the cache corresponding to a particular physical host address, we find the physical host address p that corresponds to v .

Next, we are interested in the host kernel’s direct (memory) map, where all physical memory of the host system is linearly mapped in virtual memory. Namely, if v points inside the direct map, we can use the gadget to load arbitrary physical host memory mapped at $v + x$ (with x potentially negative) into the L1 data cache, and extract it using L1TF on the linearly matched physical address $p + x$. In that way, we acquire an arbitrary host physical memory read primitive.

However, it is not guaranteed that the gadget’s base v points inside the direct map. If not, we must find the value for x such that $v + x$ accesses the gadget’s base v' in the direct map; with that, we can then add y to x such that $v + (x + y)$ loads arbitrary physical memory from the direct map that we can then leak using L1TF at the matching physical address $p + y$.

Host Targeting. From the direct map, we leak a kernel pointer to easily recognizable data and search through physical memory for this data using our previously acquired primitive. To this end, we find the physical address that corresponds to the (virtual) kernel pointer. As the physical memory is linearly mapped in the direct map, subtracting the found physical address from the kernel pointer gives us

the start of the direct map in virtual memory. With the start of the direct map, we can translate host virtual addresses in the direct map to physical addresses to leak them using L1TF, effectively breaking KASLR in the host.

We subsequently use our address translation ability to discover the location of the root page table of the host. We do so by chasing (i.e., repeatedly dereferencing) kernel pointers in the direct map through kernel structures and leaking their contents. By performing a page table walk with our leakage primitive, we can now translate arbitrary host virtual addresses to physical addresses (and with that, chase arbitrary host pointers).

Guest Targeting. Using our ability to translate arbitrary host virtual addresses to physical addresses, we chase pointers through kernel structures to find and leak the metadata of our victim VM in the host system. Doing so, we leak the root of its extended page tables and the value of its CR3 register (i.e., the root of its own page tables). Together, these enable us to perform two-dimensional page table walks, translating guest virtual addresses to host physical addresses.

Next, we evaluate the guest’s page tables to determine its address space layout in order to break KASLR in the guest. With that, we have now acquired the ability to chase arbitrary pointers in the guest kernel, and know where to start searching for interesting processes to target.

Data Extraction. Finally, with knowledge of the guest’s kernel layout, we leak the kernel structures necessary to discover all running tasks in the guest. For the target task, we chase pointers throughout its metadata structures to leak its root page table. From there, we search through the task’s memory in the guest for any sensitive data that we desire.

5. L1TF Reloaded

L1TF Reloaded, our end-to-end transient execution attack on a (proprietary) public cloud, leaks sensitive data from a victim guest VM on a mainline Linux host and a GCE host, while on AWS, we leak (only) non-sensitive data from the host itself due to deployed defenses in depth. The main challenge for the attacker is finding the targeted secret data in physical memory – within the hundreds of gigabytes of RAM commonly available on cloud servers. We address this challenge by abusing the (meta)data resident in the host and victim guest kernels. In this section, we discuss the steps necessary to build our exploit and leak sensitive data from a victim guest VM.

5.1. Local Attack Preparation

Before launching the exploit, an attacker locally prepares a guest kernel and scans for usable half-Spectre gadgets in a host that is similar to the targeted cloud’s hypervisor.

Exploiting L1TF. To leak data from arbitrary physical addresses using L1TF, the attacker needs (partial) control over the PTE that is used to cause a terminal fault, and ensure that the data is present in L1 data cache. In our threat model, the attacker has full control over a malicious VM, and thus has the ability to change their own PTEs. Specifically, they can choose the host physical address to leak from and mark the PTE invalid to trigger the terminal fault. For our attack, we use a modified version of PTEditor [48], which maps the page tables of our program into user space to enable the modification of PTEs without involving the kernel. Normally, the TLB must be flushed when the PTE is changed. However, as no TLB entry or paging-structure cache entry is created for non-present pages on Intel CPUs [49], we add this use case to PTEditor to improve our performance.

Upon accessing a non-present page, the CPU’s MMU will raise a page fault exception that is handled by the kernel’s page fault handler. Consequently, every address we attempt to leak causes a slow context switch to the kernel, as well as the execution of many instructions. This not only impedes our performance, but also affects our leakage results, as every instruction that is executed may influence the state of the L1 data cache and may even lead to the eviction of the target data. Since we have full control over the guest kernel, we apply a patch that suppresses a page fault in the kernel and bypasses the page fault handler. More specifically, instead of properly handling the L1TF-induced page fault, the interrupt handler returns immediately to a user-defined user address—executing only a few instructions in the kernel. In terms of performance, this approach yields an average 0.5 microsecond latency for a page fault as opposed to a 2.6 microsecond one for the base kernel (across 2 million measurement samples).

Half-Spectre in the Hypervisor. L1TF allows an attacker to leak data in the L1 data cache in a guest-to-host attack scenario. Thus, any data accessed by a hypervisor running

on the same core as the attacker will be susceptible to leakage. As the hypervisor by itself is unlikely to (frequently) access sensitive data, we combine L1TF with a half-Spectre gadget to trick the hypervisor into loading sensitive data into the L1 data cache, and subsequently leak it using L1TF.

For a half-Spectre gadget in the hypervisor to be usable in our attack, the attacker must be able to control its execution reliably. In particular, to induce mispredictions on a conditional branch, the branch needs to be consistently taken to train the branch predictor. Secondly, the attacker should control the memory the gadget accesses, for instance, by means of an attacker-controlled offset. To find such gadgets, we focused our analysis on VM hypercalls and potential gadgets in their handlers, because a VM may use the privileged `vmcall` instruction to call a predefined function in the hypervisor—a hypercall. As these functions can be reached reliably by an attacker VM, and some hypercalls take attacker-controlled arguments, they are fertile ground to scan for exploitable gadgets.

Within a few hours of manual code review, we found the half-Spectre gadget in the hypercall handling code for the `KVM_HC_SCHED_YIELD` hypercall shown in Listing 2. By manually tracing uses of this hypercall’s user-controlled parameters, we find that one of these values is used to index into the `phys_map` array—an array located in the direct memory map of the Linux kernel. In the base, upstream Linux kernel, all available physical memory of the host is directly mapped into the kernel’s virtual memory [50]. Thus, an out-of-bounds memory access in this array allows an attacker to transiently access all of the host’s memory. In this gadget, the index value is checked before it is used, preventing an architectural out-of-bounds access. However, in-place branch mistraining of the bounds check on `dest_id`, and evicting `map→max_apic_id` from the cache to lengthen the speculative window, allows an attacker to force the host kernel to perform the speculative load `map→phys_map[dest_id]` on any (8-byte aligned) 64-bit virtual address.

A drawback of this particular half-Spectre gadget is that the throughput, even on a mostly idle system, is very low due to the `single_task_running` check (line 9) blocking access to the gadget most of the time. To quantify this, the gadget is essentially blocked 99.9% of the time. However, this is not a fundamental issue, and we will show in Section 5.3 that with various optimizations we can use the gadget to perform an end-to-end exploit. Finally, concerning Linux’ conditional L1D flushing, this gadget resides on an “audited” code path, meaning that it is reachable without triggering conditional L1D flushing. We do not rely on this property, however, and keep our exploit technique generic: we trigger the gadget from one vCPU, and concurrently leak that data using L1TF from a sibling vCPU.

5.2. Cloud Host Profiling

To perform the attack, the attacker must determine whether their malicious VM runs on a vulnerable host system in the targeted cloud.

```

1  static void kvm_sched_yield(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
2                             unsigned long dest_id)
3  {
4      struct kvm_vcpu *target = NULL;
5      struct kvm_apic_map *map;
6
7      vcpu->stat.directed_yield_attempted++;
8
9      if (single_task_running())
10         goto no_yield;
11
12     rcu_read_lock();
13     map = rcu_dereference(vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map);
14
15     if (likely(map) && dest_id <= map->max_apic_id
16         && map->phys_map[dest_id])
17         target = map->phys_map[dest_id]->vcpu;
18
19     ...

```

Listing 2: The half-Spectre gadget we exploit in Linux/KVM. Via a hypercall, a VM can trigger this KVM function with full control over the hypercall argument `dest_id`.

For the host system, this means:

- 1) The host must run on an L1TF-vulnerable CPU.
- 2) The hypervisor must deploy insufficiently comprehensive mitigations in software.

In a virtualized environment, the hypervisor may emulate CPUID to hide the true CPU microarchitecture, and in addition, attackers do not know the exact defenses deployed. Therefore, we consider an attack scenario where we automatically detect whether a system is likely to be vulnerable from inside a guest, without relying on the hypervisor.

Vulnerable CPU. Intel server CPUs of the Skylake microarchitecture and earlier are vulnerable to L1TF [43]. Hence, to address the first requirement, we assess whether the attacker VM runs on such a system. Unfortunately, we cannot assume that self-reporting by means of the CPUID instruction is accurate, as the instruction may be emulated. Instead, we measure the size of the Path History Register (PHR), which in Skylake and older microarchitectures is only 93 branches, while on recent CPUs such as Ice Lake have PHRs it is as large as 194 [51]. The PHR is a shift register that records the global history of recently executed branches (and whether they were taken) to help predict correlated branch patterns. Thus, we can determine the PHR size by testing how many dummy branches we can insert between branches while still capturing the correlation between them—using an algorithm from prior work [51] adapted to a virtualized environment.

A PHR size equal to 93 does not *guarantee* that the CPU is vulnerable to L1TF. For instance, the Cascade Lake microarchitecture has the same PHR size, but is not vulnerable to L1TF by virtue of hardware mitigations. Even so, PHR size estimation provides attackers with a quick test to narrow down the search for vulnerable systems, without wasting cycles on CPUs that are known not to be vulnerable.

Deployed Hypervisor Mitigations. As the only mitigations that tackle the root of the issue in software are prohibitively expensive, the default configuration on operating systems

such as Linux relies on spot mitigations instead. We address the second requirement by checking the inventory of software-based mitigations against L1TF present on the system via timing side channels.

First, we measure memory access latency before and after a VM guest-to-host context switch, to determine whether the hypervisor implements L1D flushing. We prime the L1 data cache by accessing a set of addresses that neither evict other addresses in the same cache set nor incur prefetching by the memory controller. By triggering a VM exit path that does not trash the L1 data cache and measuring the addresses’ subsequent access latency, we can tell whether the cache was flushed. Doing this for both audited and non-audited code paths, we can also distinguish between (full) L1D flushing and conditional L1D flushing.

Next, we build upon prior work [52] to detect SMT using a port-contention side channel. On a modern CPU, each physical core contains a number of execution ports that process micro-operations that originate from instructions executed on either of the cores’ hyperthreads. As the ports are shared by sibling hyperthreads, contention can lead to an increased instruction execution latency for one vCPU if a sibling vCPU occupies the same ports. Thus, we determine whether SMT is enabled by measuring the instruction latency of a particular contention-sensitive workload that runs on two vCPUs on the same physical core against a single-vCPU baseline.

Finally, we profile for strict core-scheduling by examining vCPU idle time. We let one vCPU execute the contention code snippet and measure its execution time. On the sibling vCPU, we constantly cause VM-exits to transfer into the hypervisor’s context. If the contention snippet’s performance degrades significantly more compared to normal port contention, this indicates the forced idling (i.e., stuning) of our contention vCPU due to strict core-scheduling.

5.3. Gadget Base Discovery

L1TF can leak data from any physical address as long as the data at that address resides in the L1 data cache. To make sure sensitive data from the hypervisor is loaded into the L1 data cache, we want to use the half-Spectre gadget in Listing 2 to speculatively perform an out-of-bounds memory access. However, since the physical address of the data is unknown, we cannot extract it from the cache. We now explain how we solve this and build our arbitrary host physical memory read primitive.

The half-Spectre gadget accesses an array in memory by taking the address of index (offset) zero of the array (i.e., the gadget’s base) v and adding an attacker-controlled offset (index) x . While v is unknown, we know that $v = \&\text{map} \rightarrow \text{phys_map}$. By making use of the page alignment of the `map` object, which is dynamically allocated upon the creation of our VM, we elect to brute force its physical address. To do so, we continually trigger the half-Spectre gadget with offset zero (i.e., `dest_id = 0`) to bring the start of the `phys_map` structure into the L1 data cache. Using L1TF on the sibling vCPU, we stride at page

```

1  static int __pv_send_ipi(unsigned long *ipi_bitmap,
2                          struct kvm_apic_map *map,
3                          struct kvm_lapic_irq *irq,
4                          u32 min)
5  {
6      int i, count = 0;
7      struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
8
9      if (min > map->max_apic_id)
10         return 0;
11
12     for_each_set_bit(i, ipi_bitmap,
13                     min((u32)BITS_PER_LONG,
14                         (map->max_apic_id - min + 1))) {
15         if (map->phys_map[min + i]) {
16             ...

```

Listing 3: The architectural gadget we use to help locate the half-Spectre gadget’s base.

granularity through physical memory, guessing the base’s physical address p . The beginning of the `phys_map` array holds a pointer to a `kvm_lapic` structure for each vCPU of the VM, which in our case is two pointers. From here, we know we have correctly guessed the physical address of the two pointers if we leak them using L1TF.

The discovery of the physical address p of our gadget’s base yields an arbitrary host physical memory read primitive. Since the base is `kmalloc`’d and hence points inside the host’s direct map, passing a (possibly) negative offset x to the half-Spectre gadget lets it speculatively load from address $p+x$ through the direct map (as the linear mapping of the direct map means it matches $v+x$).

While the accessed array is located in the host kernel’s direct memory map for this particular half-Spectre gadget, for another it may not be. In that case, we must find the gadget’s base mapped in the direct map at v' by speculatively trying different values of x for our out-of-bounds memory access at $v+x$. We can verify whether we encounter the base in the direct map at v' by checking the leaked data using L1TF and seeing whether it corresponds to the leaked data from v . Using the knowledge of the base’s physical address, the attacker would know the base’s offset in the physical memory page, allowing them to search through memory at a page-sized stride; regardless, this step requires additional optimization to be practical.

As we discussed prior in Section 5.1, the throughput of the half-Spectre gadget is very low. To compensate, we optimize our approach by firstly not leaking the entirety of the pointers, and secondly by employing an alternative half-Spectre gadget that, while not exploitable due to its particular data flow, can consistently load our actually targeted gadget’s base address into cache. We show this architectural gadget in Listing 3.

5.4. Host Targeting

Next, using our arbitrary physical memory read primitive, we fully leak the two previously mentioned kernel pointers that are at the beginning of `phys_map`. We know from manual analysis that these two pointers point to structures that start with easily recognizable data in the host kernel’s

direct map; we refer to them as direct map pointers. Now, we aim to break KASLR in the host kernel by finding the physical address of the data one of the pointers points to.

As the direct map is backed by 1 GB pages in memory, we know the lower 30 bits of the physical addresses of the pointers (because the pointer is a virtual address, and the direct map is linearly mapped into virtual memory). We can brute-force the remaining few physical address bits by leaking from every possible physical address and checking whether the leaked data matches the data we are looking for. Once we have found the physical address that corresponds to one of the pointers, we can subtract the physical address from the pointer to find the virtual address of the start of the host’s direct map; this gives us the ability to translate direct map pointers into physical addresses—allowing us to leak data from any kernel direct map pointer using L1TF.

Though we now have the ability to leak data from any kernel direct map pointer, we do not have any knowledge about the layout of the host’s memory, and thus do not know the location of interesting data to leak. Hence, we choose to perform *pointer chasing* on the pointers we have access to through kernel structures in search of such data. By continuously dereferencing pointers and finding new pointers to chase to more data structures in the host kernel, we can eventually locate valuable structures that contain e.g., root page tables, heap memory mappings, etc. One could, in essence, view the majority of the exploit chain as one long pointer chase throughout the host’s physical memory.

As we show in Figure 3, we take our own vCPU’s `kvm_lapic` structure (which we know exists at the beginning of `phys_map`) and do a pointer chase from it through the host kernel, only using direct map pointers, in search of interesting structures to leak. In particular, we discover our own `kvm_vcpu` structure, which represents our vCPU, our `task_struct`, describing the host process running our VM, and the VM’s address space information in its `mm_struct`. From the latter structure, we leak the location of our task’s root page table. With it, we can translate arbitrary host virtual addresses to physical addresses by performing a page table walk using our leakage primitive. Now, rather than being limited to direct map pointers, we can leak data from any kernel pointer in the host system.

5.5. Guest Targeting

With the ability to chase any kernel pointer in the host and leak data from it, we now aim to find a victim VM. We start by looking at our own `task_struct`, which is part of a linked list of all tasks in the host; from it, we can leak the process ID and command, i.e., the name of the task, for all processes running on the host. From the task name, we can make an educated guess on which process is in charge of running another VM. Having selected a task that runs a VM, we locate the structures that represent its (open) files, and find the file that KVM hands out to represent the VM. Using it, we discover the victim VM’s metadata: the `kvm` and `kvm_vcpu` structs.




Figure 3: Example of a pointer chase in our exploit chain. As we can translate a (virtual) pointer to a physical address, we leak the data to which the pointer points, essentially dereferencing it. From the `kvm_lapic` struct, we leak consecutive pointers to other structs until we find the host’s root page table (`pgd`, Page Global Directory).

From the metadata, we leak the root of the victim VM’s extended page tables, as well as the current value of its CR3 register, which is a physical address at which the root page table used by the guest itself resides; this root page table can thus be of any process currently running in the guest.

Together, these enable us to perform a two-dimensional page table walk, translating guest virtual addresses to host physical addresses. With that, we can now chase pointers within the guest VM’s kernel and leak their data via L1TF.

However, we do not yet know where to start our pointer chasing to discover interesting structures. For that, we need to break KASLR in the guest kernel. Using the root page table we leaked earlier, we read the kernel’s address space layout, which is possible because every process maps the upper kernel range of the virtual address space, and find the start of the kernel’s text and the start of the guest kernel’s direct map. With the former, we can start our pointer chase in the guest kernel, while with the latter we can skip most of the costly page table walks in the case of (common) guest pointers inside the direct map.

5.6. Data Extraction

Armed with knowledge of the victim guest’s kernel layout, we start by leaking its `init_task` struct, and from there traverse its tasks to find a promising victim process handling sensitive data. If the targeted victim process runs as a system service, we can apply a further optimization: We first find `systemd` as the first child of `swapper`, and then only traverse the children of `systemd` to locate the victim process. We note that a similar optimization is possible for the prior phase in the attack where we locate the victim VM: by abusing the tree structure of the process tree, one could search for the victim VM inside the host kernel more efficiently. However, we did not implement this.

After we located the victim process, we leverage knowledge about the target’s process layout to continue the attack. Consider Nginx as example. By inspecting its `mm_struct`, we recover its root page table and the virtual address of the start of its heap memory; using the former, we determine the physical address of the latter to enable data leakage from Nginx’s heap. Using the knowledge that Nginx stores its private key at a static location on its heap, we leak the two

prime numbers that comprise the RSA key and reconstruct the private key using the RSA protocol. Note that, even if we did not know the key’s location, it can be brute-forced since the two prime numbers are surrounded by two “magic” numbers (PEM-format tags), making it easy for us to recognize them.

For the purpose of reliability, we implement an additional check to ensure that we leak all 2048 bits of Nginx’s key correctly. To do so, we exploit the sparsity of prime numbers: if we make an error during key leakage, the resulting (large) number will with a very high likelihood not be prime. Hence, by checking if the leaked number is a prime number, we are able to verify our leakage results.

5.7. Chase and Check

Our leakage primitive may be unreliable, causing the leaked values to contain errors. As a result, if only a single error transpires during the exploit’s chain of pointer chases, the attack fails. To overcome this issue, we do a sanity check after every a few pointer chases, where we consider whether the new location we arrived at is consistent with what we expect—if not, we backtrack. We refer to this as chasing-and-checking. A simple example can be given by chasing down a doubly linked list: after every traversal of the next pointer, one also leaks the previous pointer, and check that it indeed points to the previous location. We do this throughout the exploit, with different checks tailored to different places throughout the exploit’s long chase.

6. End-to-End Cloud Exploitation

Our end-to-end attack is specifically tailored to target KVM-based hypervisors, which we know are active in the AWS and GCE clouds. However, since the L1TF vulnerability is a CPU bug (and is thus present on all systems running on such CPUs), and a half-Spectre gadget is a common code pattern that is not unique to Linux, the L1TF Reloaded attack technique should work on any host system with a controllable hypervisor gadget. That is, as long as the host CPU is vulnerable to L1TF, and the attacker can find and control a usable half-Spectre gadget in the hypervisor to load any desired data into the L1 data cache.

6.1. Exploitation Setup

Our cloud exploitation efforts involved three clouds (self-hosted, AWS, GCE) and three types of VMs (attacker, victim, noise). First, we describe their setup in detail. In each subsequent subsection, we will detail which combination of these we used.

Host Platforms. We evaluate our L1TF Reloaded exploit on three platforms. The first platform is *self-hosted*: a local Skylake server with an Intel Xeon Silver 4110 CPU and 32GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 24.04 with Linux kernel 6.12, whose KVM subsystem hosts our VMs. This is the only platform on which we have system-level (even physical) access to the machine. For the second platform, AWS, we rent a dedicated host system of the C5 instance type with 96 vCPUs and 192GB of RAM [28]; these instances are reported to run on Skylake and Cascade Lake CPUs—of which only the former is vulnerable to L1TF. We note that we did not have any issue acquiring a machine backed by a vulnerable Skylake CPU on AWS. Last is GCE, where we rent a dedicated host system of the N1 instance type with 96 vCPUs and 825GB² of RAM [27]; these instances are reported to run on Sandy Bridge, Ivy Bridge, Haswell, Broadwell, or Skylake CPUs—which are all vulnerable to L1TF. Both the rented AWS and GCE hosts are part of the regular production cloud fleets. We can only spawn VMs on these hosts via the regular customer API. As such, we do not have access to, control over, or insider knowledge about the underlying hypervisor or other system-level internals.

Attacker VM. For our *attacker VM*, we spawn (on any of the host platforms) a Ubuntu 22.04 VM with 2 vCPUs, 7.5GB of memory and a 50GB disk. We install our custom guest kernel (based on Linux 6.13) that speeds up L1TF leakage by inserting a page fault handler bypass (cf. Section 5.1). Lastly, we build the L1TF Reloaded exploit, implemented mostly in C.

Our exploit process consists of two threads: one that triggers the half-Spectre gadget to load data into the L1 data cache, and one that utilizes L1TF to leak the data out of that (same, shared) L1 data cache. This requires both threads to run simultaneously on two hyperthreads of a single physical core. Due to the core-scheduling mitigation (which we find deployed by both AWS and GCE), the hypervisor schedules our attacker VM’s two vCPUs simultaneously on the same physical core, automatically fulfilling this requirement.

Victim VMs. We show the attack against two types of example victim VMs. Both have 2 vCPUs, 7.5GB of memory, and 10GB of disk space (default on GCE). Our *Ubuntu victim VM* runs Ubuntu 24.04, while our *Debian victim VM* runs Debian 12 Bookworm (default on GCE), both

²While Google’s API listed the machine as having 624GB of RAM, during exploitation we had to chase physical addresses around 800GB. We concluded that the real machine must have had more RAM, and we configured our exploit to assume 825GB. Note: this (attacker-chosen) configured amount determines average exploit runtimes.

with their respective default settings. On both we install the default (with respect to their OS) Nginx web server, as served by apt, as our target. Nginx is set up with the default HTTPS configuration with an auto-generated self-signed TLS certificate.

The security of the web server fundamentally relies on the secrecy of the private RSA key of this certificate: once leaked, you can impersonate the web server to any desired malicious ends. Therefore, the goal of our exploit is to leak this private RSA key to showcase concretely how we can extract a specific, high-value secret from a victim VM. But in general, the exploit could leak *any* in-memory victim data.

Noise VMs. We also deployed VMs generating large amounts of system-level noise to investigate the reliability of our exploit. All such *noise VMs* have 32 vCPUs, 128GB of memory, and 1TB of disk space. To pressure the memory subsystem, the *cache noise VM* runs two workloads, each with 16 vCPUs allocated 16 vCPUs: a cache-thrashing workload that consists of 16 processes, each striding through their own 1GB buffer at cacheline granularity in a tight loop—continuously trashing the last-level cache; and a cache-coherency workload, which consists of one process with 16 threads that each (independently) randomly reads from or writes to one of the 128 cachelines of a shared 8KB buffer—generating considerable cache coherency traffic between cores. To generate I/O pressure, a *disk noise VM* constantly copies around hundreds of gigabytes of files (and syncs those changes to disk), while a *network noise VM* constantly downloads huge files from external servers.

6.2. Profiling AWS and GCE Hosts

After developing our exploit on our self-hosted cloud platform, we spawned an attacker VM on both AWS and GCE hosts. Our first objective is to determine the vulnerability of these platforms to L1TF Reloaded, as discussed in Section 5.2. For both AWS and GCE, we determined our host CPU to be an Intel Skylake CPU, vulnerable to L1TF. As for mitigations against L1TF, our profiling experiments showed that conditional L1D flushing was enabled. Moreover, port contention indicated that our attacker VM’s two vCPUs were simultaneously scheduled on sibling hyperthreads of the same physical core. This confirms SMT to be enabled, and strengthens our belief that core-scheduling is enabled, as suggested by both GCE [18] and AWS [53] documentation. Lastly, we determine that strict core-scheduling (i.e., sibling stuning upon VM-exit) is not deployed. Hence, we conclude that on both the AWS and GCE platforms, we are running on an L1TF-vulnerable CPU with insufficient software mitigations to stop L1TF Reloaded.

While it is known that both AWS and GCE employ KVM-based hypervisors, we do not have knowledge concerning their exact versions or the presence of custom patches. Hence, we next verify whether the half-Spectre gadget we identified in mainline KVM is also present and exploitable. We do so by performing the Gadget Base Discovery phase of L1TF Reloaded, and find it was success-




Figure 4: The byte error rate, i.e., the chance of a byte being leaked incorrectly, as a function of the time we spend leaking each byte. Our measurements on mainline Linux and AWS were so similar that we merged their data points.

ful through the subsequently enabled out-of-bounds (host-kernel) data leakage. From this, we confirm that the exploitable half-Spectre gadget is also present in the AWS and GCE hypervisors.

6.3. Leakage Primitive Evaluation

On all three clouds, we spawn an attacker VM that is now armed with our desired leakage primitive: an arbitrary read into the host kernel’s address space. We evaluate this leakage primitive on all three clouds with an experiment that measures its leakage rate and accuracy when leaking chunks of both 8 bytes and 256 bytes of random data, representative of leaking pointers and a 2048 bit private RSA key. We display the results in Figure 4.

The vertical line indicates the setting used in our exploit: a leakage of about 1 B/s, resulting in roughly a 95% accuracy on mainline Linux and AWS, and a 50% accuracy on GCE. We confirm with Google that this reduction in accuracy on GCE machine instances is caused by a defense they implement that is not public; at the time of writing, they were not able to share any further information about said defense. As we show in this paper, this reduced accuracy is not a fundamental problem, as we are still able to launch our end-to-end attack and leak sensitive guest data successfully.

6.4. Host Kernel Reverse Engineering

To discover the data we need to leak to implement our end-to-end exploit, we perform pointer chasing through kernel structures on the host kernel. However, we as an attacker have no a priori knowledge concerning the exact host kernel version used, its configuration, and possible patches that a cloud vendor may have implemented in the production environment. In order to perform the required pointer chase through the host kernel, we need to determine the offsets

	mainline Linux	GCE	AWS
kvm_lapic + 78	3e8	695	7ba
kvm_lapic + 80	1	8000000000000000	8000000000000000
kvm_lapic + 88	2	100000000	1
kvm_lapic + 90	fffffa03509eec600	10	2
kvm_lapic + 98	100010101	ffff9352eff70e40	ffff93e461d18000
kvm_lapic + a0	ffffffff	100000101	100000101
kvm_lapic + a8	fffffa035f6c5e000	ffffffff	ffffffff
kvm_lapic + b0	0	ffff934164541000	ffff93e461274000
kvm_lapic + b8	0	0	0

Figure 5: Example of reversing the offset of struct `kvm_lapic`’s `vcpu` field (highlighted for mainline Linux), by leaking the `kvm_lapic`’s data on GCE and AWS. The obvious (and correct) guess here for both AWS and GCE is 0x98.

of some specific fields in the structures we traverse. This requires some manual reverse-engineering efforts.

We exploit the fact that both AWS and GCE use KVM-based hypervisors, so we predict the hypervisor to be very similar to our self-hosted system. On the self-hosted system, with one attacker VM up and running, we dump all the relevant data structures at runtime. Next, we from an attacker VM on AWS and GCE use our leakage primitive to recover (parts of) the same data structures. Since we have acquired the offsets for the structures in the base Linux kernel already, we can compare the leaked data and make educated guesses about where the unknown kernel’s data resides. We illustrate the aforementioned with a simple example in Figure 5.

Not all structures are straightforward to reverse engineer, however. Some structures have fields we aim to target that are thousands of bytes removed from their position in the base Linux kernel, and others are annotated with randomization compiler attributes; these require more manual effort to reverse and in some cases pointer chases to discover. Regardless, we were able to determine all offsets required to start the attack on both the GCE and AWS clouds.

6.5. Exploit Evaluation

Armed with our leakage primitive and knowledge of the host kernel’s data structures, we are ready for end-to-end exploitation. On all three clouds, we spawn one attacker VM, one Ubuntu victim VM, and one Debian victim VM, and launch our exploit. On the self-hosted and GCE clouds, the exploit succeeds in leaking the private keys of both victims. On AWS, however, the exploit only succeeds in leaking meta-data from the host kernel, thereby discovering the existence of the two victim VMs on the system but failing to leak guest data from these victims themselves. We confirm with AWS that they, as a defense in depth, unmap guest memory from the host’s address space; we discuss this further in Section 7.2.

For an in-depth evaluation, we on GCE now allocate six dedicated host platforms, and spawn an attacker VM on each. On one dedicated host, we also spawn a Ubuntu victim VM, whereas on the other five hosts, we spawn a Debian victim VM. Each victim VM has an independently generated private Nginx key. We run the exploit on these host systems for a total of 28 runs, out of which 25 completed

successfully; there, we leak the entire private key of the victim VM correctly. The other three runs did not reach the end of the exploit, due to Gadget Base Discovery failure. Among the successful exploit runs, the average run time was 14.2 hours (standard deviation: 16.2 hours), which was spent as follows:

- Find Gadget Base: 10.9h (76.3%)
- Find Victim VM in Host: 2.6h (18.3%)
- Find Victim Nginx in Guest: 0.3h (2.2%)
- Leak Nginx’s TLS key: 0.4h (3.2%)

Note the large standard deviation: the initial step of finding the gadget’s base can take half an hour if we are lucky, or three days if we are not.

6.6. Exploit Noise Resilience

The aforementioned evaluation of the exploit chain was performed on dedicated hosts that were mostly idle. Now, we aim to verify whether the attack also works as effectively when large amounts of system noise are present, as it may be on a real shared cloud. To do so, we must put the system under extreme memory (i.e., cache) pressure, and perform intensive I/O operations continuously. Note that CPU-intensive workloads on other cores do not influence the attack, whereas one could possibly make the argument that many interrupts from I/O could disrupt the exploit’s flow/synchronization, or that cache pressure could disrupt its cache side channel used to exploit L1TF.

On GCE, we spawn an attacker VM, a Debian victim VM, and three noise VMs: cache, disk, and network. Moreover, from an external server, we access the victim Nginx web server 100 times per second. We repeated the experiment that produced the results in Figure 4, and found no significant differences. Next, we repeated the end-to-end exploit 10 times, which succeeded all 10 runs by leaking the key correctly every time. For these runs, the average run-time was 15.2 hours (with a standard deviation of 9.9 hours)—showing no significant change from the runs on the idle system. From this, we conclude that our exploit is robust under extreme system noise.

6.7. Exploit Stealthiness

By design, microarchitectural attacks are stealthy. That is not only because they do not trigger architectural faults, but also because their leakage traces occur at the microarchitectural level, which is outside the reach of traditional monitoring systems (which operate the architectural level).

We confirm this through our efforts to implement real-world microarchitectural exploitation in the production clouds of AWS and GCE. Namely, across development, leakage experiments, host kernel reverse engineering, and running the end-to-end exploit repeatedly, over a time of several months, AWS and Google informed us that none of their cloud monitoring systems ever detected L1TF Reloaded. This includes Google’s systems monitoring “certain classes of these [L1TF] attacks”, deployed since 2018 [18].

7. Mitigations

With the L1TF Reloaded attack described in this paper, we demonstrated that L1TF—7 years after its discovery—can still be used to leak sensitive data from other VMs on commercial clouds, despite the commonly deployed software mitigations.

7.1. Spot Mitigations

We start by discussing spot mitigations, specifically focusing on those relevant to L1TF Reloaded.

L1TF Mitigation. As discussed in Section 2.3, all spot mitigations that specifically target L1TF are ineffective against L1TF Reloaded or incur major performance overheads. The mitigation deployed by AWS and GCE, i.e., conditional L1D flushing together with core scheduling, is by far the most performant mitigation that still prevents direct guest-to-guest attacks. It does, however, not impede L1TF Reloaded: on both AWS and GCE clouds, we crafted an arbitrary read primitive into the host virtual address space using half-Spectre.

Half-Spectre Gadget Scanning. A straightforward mitigation strategy is to remove all half-Spectre gadgets from the host kernel. If no gadgets exist, the attack we describe in this paper is no longer possible. However, as the code pattern that constitutes them is simply an array access with a bounds check on its index—an extremely common operation—it is not likely that one can completely avoid introducing them into code. In addition, automated Spectre gadget scanners [12], [54], [55], [56], [57], [58] cannot guarantee that all potential gadgets can be found, and in many cases do not offer an analysis of their potential exploitability. In short, finding half-Spectre gadgets is a unsolved problem, and protection based on their removal does not provide robust security guarantees. This research also offers evidence for this: despite Google’s efforts in 2020 to remove all half-Spectre gadgets from KVM that they could find [59], we found the exploitable gadget in Listing 2.

7.2. Blanket Mitigations

Next we discuss ‘blanket mitigations’, which aim to provide generic, future-proof protection against broad classes of microarchitectural attacks via system-wide hardening techniques (i.e., defense in depth).

Unmapping Memory. The key idea of memory unmapping mitigations is that microarchitectural attacks cannot leak memory that is not mapped. Namely, by unmapping memory from the hypervisor’s virtual address space, a microarchitectural attack (including L1TF Reloaded) cannot force the hypervisor to access this memory to enable its leakage. This results in a major attack surface reduction at a low performance cost. A major challenge for these types of

mitigations however is determining what data to unmap, i.e., what data should be considered sensitive or secret.

Exclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO) [60], [61], secret_memfd [62], and process-local memory [63] are similar implementations of a memory unmapping mitigation in Linux; they provide the user with the ability to unmap (specific) user-space memory from the kernel—or guest memory from KVM. It is then left to the user to decide what data to unmap. AWS employs this type of mitigation in their Nitro hypervisor as well [31], thereby preventing our L1TF Reloaded exploit from leaking data of other guests. More specifically, we used our exploit to verify that guest memory is not mapped into Linux’ direct map on AWS machine instances, and also found that guest registers are not saved into their `kvm_vcpu` structures. AWS did not provide more details on what exact memory they unmap, and we did not verify whether an attacker may still leak guest data from other places, e.g., kernel stacks or I/O buffers. Secret-Free Hypervisor [64], for instance, offers a detailed description of what memory they unmap for various hypervisors, in which they include, for example, kernel stacks; we note that from this work, we find that global I/O buffers cannot easily be unmapped. Alternatively, Address Space Isolation (ASI) [65], [66], [67] dynamically switches between different address spaces. There, KVM normally runs in a restricted address space without sensitive data, and upon a sensitive memory access, switches to a full address space, enabling the application of (expensive) mitigations only when necessary. Here, determining what data is sensitive remains difficult. Google deployed ASI on their L1TF-vulnerable CPUs in response to L1TF Reloaded [30].

Under any unmapping mitigation, the hypervisor still requires its own data (and code) to be mapped. As a result, this type of mitigation strategy inherently leaves host data vulnerable to leakage. While such data are not necessarily sensitive, we nonetheless argue that leaking (non-sensitive) host memory hurts system security. Namely, as part of an exploit chain involving multiple vulnerabilities, having the ability to read host memory is valuable to an attacker. For instance, one could use these host data to bypass stack canaries, break host KASLR, find target data to corrupt using a memory safety bug, or verify correct heap massaging for use-after-free exploitation.

Core Isolation. Lastly, we consider kernel core isolation as proposed by Quarantine [68]. The authors describe isolating privileged and unprivileged execution on different physical cores, which become privileged and unprivileged cores. As a result, guests will run only on their own unprivileged cores, and will never be co-located with the kernel; any privileged operation will be delegated to a privileged core. This prevents both the guest-to-guest and guest-to-host attack scenarios, as different security domains are always isolated to separate physical cores. Quarantine is a comprehensive mitigation against all on-core leaking transient execution attacks (including L1TF), protecting both other guests and host data. It is however not reported how Quarantine performs when the hypervisor runs more than a single VM.

8. Discussion

Applicability to Other Cloud Environments. With our end-to-end attack, we show that a combined exploitation of L1TF and a half-Spectre gadget in the hypervisor can leak data from guest VMs on a host system, and is practical in realistic commercial cloud settings. In particular, our attack can leak non-sensitive host data from C5 cloud instances of AWS, and that it can leak sensitive guest data from all VMs in the system on N1 cloud instances of GCE. While the gadgets used in this paper are specific to KVM (and thus KVM-based proprietary hypervisors), other hypervisors are likely to expose similar half-Spectre gadgets, enabling this attack. As long as L1TF is not mitigated in hardware, and the hypervisor can be made to load arbitrary data into the L1 data cache, an attacker can leak arbitrary host and/or guest VM data. As older CPUs vulnerable to L1TF are still part of the fleets of many commercial cloud providers and half-Spectre gadgets consist of code patterns common in virtually all software, cloud providers other than AWS and Google could be at risk.

Prevalence of L1TF Vulnerable CPUs. A main requirement for our attack is that the host system’s CPU is affected by L1TF, a vulnerability known for 7 years with hardware mitigations implemented in newer CPUs. Yet, cloud providers expect long life times of their hardware, leading to a substantial number of hosts in their fleet where L1TF requires mitigation in software. Unfortunately, public data on fleet composition or instance popularity is not available for major cloud providers. Thus, we cannot accurately determine how many systems would be affected by our attack.

However, to estimate the prevalence of vulnerable systems, we inspect the specification of rentable instance types in public clouds as proxy. For AWS general purpose EC2 instances, out of 10 Intel-based instance types, 4 may be backed by L1TF affected CPUs [28]. Similar, out of 20 Intel-based instance types available in GCE, 4 may use according CPUs [27]. Hence, we expect that a substantial amount of L1TF-affected CPUs are actively in-use to this day.

Similar Transient Execution Vulnerabilities. Other transient execution vulnerabilities have been discovered that, similarly to L1TF, allow unprivileged software to leak data from the local compute-core. Examples include MDS [8], [9], [10] (2019) and GDS [69] (2023) on Intel CPUs, and TSA [70] (2025) on AMD CPUs. While this work focused on L1TF from 2018, researchers keep discovering new variants. This highlights the continuing danger posed by both known and yet unknown CPU vulnerabilities that enable core-local data leakage. Since the techniques to exploit all of these vulnerabilities are largely the same (e.g., side-channel analysis), we think our successful exploitation of L1TF in real-world cloud settings (even under heavy system noise) strengthens confidence in the belief that similar vulnerabilities may pose serious real-world threats as well.

9. Related Work

9.1. Profiling CPUs and Detecting Mitigations

Prior work has shown the possibilities of identifying CPU microarchitectures and information about microarchitectural components in non-native attack scenarios, such as web browsers. For instance, Trampert et al. [71] present side-channel-related benchmarks that reveal CPU properties relevant to transient execution attacks, such as cache sizes or cache associativities, from the browser. Similarly, Saito et al. [72] show methods that help determine, among others, the number of CPU cores, presence of SMT, and CPU family type. While the aforementioned work focuses on browsers, we in our work target a virtualized attack scenario.

Rather than investigate the microarchitectural properties of a CPU directly, other work aims to directly determine a system’s susceptibility to particular transient execution attacks. GhostBuster [73], for example, evaluates existing tools that check a system’s vulnerability against transient execution attacks. The authors classify such tools into two categories: information gathering tools, which rely on system information sources such as CPUID and MSRs to map available mitigations [74], [75], and empirical tools, which emulate specific attacks to determine whether the transient execution attack is possible (and thus not mitigated) [46], [76]. For tools in the latter class, they note that one can use either performance monitoring counters [76] or side-channel attacks [46] to do so. In general, both classes of tools do not consider the virtualized attack scenario, as there CPUID and MSR access can be emulated and performance monitoring counters are rarely virtualized.

9.2. L1TF

The Foreshadow attack [7], [13], later described by Intel as L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) [41], [42], demonstrated that transient execution attacks could not only breach the user-kernel boundary [2], but also security boundaries such as Intel SGX [7] and the separation between virtual machines [13], [77]. This led to the implementation of mitigations such as core scheduling [15], [45] and L1D flushing [41], [44] to prevent L1TF as it was originally described.

Prior work showed how one could exploit L1TF despite the aforementioned mitigations [24], [25], [26]. Manthey et al. found half-Spectre gadgets in the Xen hypervisor, and described how they could potentially be exploited in tandem with L1TF [24]; specifically, to use the gadget to bring data into the cache on one hyperthread while L1TF is used on another to read the cached data. As a follow-up to the aforementioned, Stecklina demonstrated this attack by introducing an artificial half-Spectre gadget, showing how it bypasses the mitigations against L1TF in the Linux kernel [26]. While this was a synthetic attack that served to validate the deployed defenses, we implement the first end-to-end attack that exploits this combination of transient execution vulnerabilities on unmodified hypervisors. Next, Schwarzl et al. [25] show an attack on a Linux kernel

without retpoline [78], where the attacker exploits attacker-controlled addresses remaining in general-purpose registers and their speculative dereferences in the kernel upon interrupt-induced context switches. In this manner, data from the L3 data cache is loaded into the L1 data cache, and can be leaked using L1TF. Whereas we in our attack trick the hypervisor into loading any desired sensitive data, the attacker here has no control over what data the host accesses, and relies on the host continuously accessing sensitive data to ensure it remains in the shared L3 cache.

10. Conclusion

In this paper, we have shown how two different transient execution vulnerabilities, L1TF and half-Spectre gadgets, can be combined into a powerful attack primitive. A malicious VM can bypass existing mitigations against guest-to-guest leakage attacks by using a half-Spectre gadget in the hypervisor. The gadget in the hypervisor lets it act as a confused deputy, loading host physical memory into the L1 data cache. On a sibling SMT core, the malicious VM can then use L1TF to leak the host physical memory from L1 data cache, potentially leaking memory from other guests on the system. With that, we demonstrate an end-to-end, guest-to-guest attack on base Linux and GCP cloud instance machines that leaks a private key from an Nginx web server running in a victim VM in an average time of 14.2 hours.

With our attack, we demonstrate that mitigating transient execution vulnerabilities in isolation is not effective when their exploitation can be combined to not only circumvent existing defenses but yield powerful attack primitives. Blanket mitigations such as memory unmapping or core isolation would have prevented this attack from occurring, and indeed successfully defended the AWS cloud against our exploit. Not comprehensively addressing transient execution vulnerabilities leaves room for novel combinations of exploitation to rear their heads.

11. Acknowledgements

We thank Alexandra Sandulescu and Eduardo Vela Nava from Google and Federico Maggi, Claudio Canella, and Moritz Lipp from AWS for their collaboration throughout the project. We thank the anonymous reviewers for their feedback. We thank Google and AWS for providing us with free cloud credits to rent VMs for this research. This project was co-funded by the European Union under ERC Advanced grant No. 101141972 (“Ghostbuster”), Horizon Europe under grant agreement No. 101120962 (“Rescale”). It was additionally funded by NWO under Gravitation grant 024.006.037 (“CiCS”) and the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate under the AVR “Memo” project. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union, the European Research Council or any of the funding agencies. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

References

- [1] P. Kocher, J. Horn, A. Fogh, D. Genkin, D. Gruss, W. Haas, M. Hamburg, M. Lipp, S. Mangard, T. Prescher, M. Schwarz, and Y. Yarom, "Spectre attacks: Exploiting speculative execution," in *IEEE S&P*, 2019.
- [2] M. Lipp, M. Schwarz, D. Gruss, T. Prescher, W. Haas, A. Fogh, J. Horn, S. Mangard, P. Kocher, D. Genkin *et al.*, "Meltdown: reading kernel memory from user space," in *USENIX Security*, 2018.
- [3] G. Maisuradze and C. Rossow, "ret2spec: Speculative execution using return stack buffers," in *CCS*, 2018.
- [4] J. Van Bulck, D. Moghimi, M. Schwarz, M. Lipp, M. Minkin, D. Genkin, Y. Yuval, B. Sunar, D. Gruss, and F. Piessens, "LVI: Hijacking Transient Execution through Microarchitectural Load Value Injection," in *IEEE S&P*, 2020.
- [5] J. Wikner and K. Razavi, "Retbleed: Arbitrary speculative code execution with return instructions," in *USENIX Security*, 2022.
- [6] E. Göktas, K. Razavi, G. Portokalidis, H. Bos, and C. Giuffrida, "Speculative probing: Hacking blind in the Spectre era," in *CCS*, 2020.
- [7] J. Van Bulck, M. Minkin, O. Weisse, D. Genkin, B. Kasikci, F. Piessens, M. Silberstein, T. F. Wenisch, Y. Yarom, and R. Strackx, "Foreshadow: Extracting the keys to the Intel SGX kingdom with transient out-of-order execution," in *USENIX Security*, 2018.
- [8] S. Van Schaik, A. Milburn, S. Österlund, P. Frigo, G. Maisuradze, K. Razavi, H. Bos, and C. Giuffrida, "Ridl: Rogue in-flight data load," in *IEEE S&P*, 2019.
- [9] C. Canella, D. Genkin, L. Giner, D. Gruss, M. Lipp, M. Minkin, D. Moghimi, F. Piessens, M. Schwarz, B. Sunar, J. Van Bulck, and Y. Yarom, "Fallout: Leaking data on Meltdown-resistant CPUs," in *CCS*, 2019.
- [10] M. Schwarz, M. Lipp, D. Moghimi, J. Van Bulck, J. Stecklina, T. Prescher, and D. Gruss, "Zombieload: Cross-privilege-boundary data sampling," in *CCS*, 2019.
- [11] E. Barberis, P. Frigo, M. Muench, H. Bos, and C. Giuffrida, "Branch History Injection: On the Effectiveness of Hardware Mitigations Against Cross-Privilege Spectre-v2 Attacks," in *USENIX Security*, 2022.
- [12] S. Wiebing, A. de Faveri Tron, H. Bos, and C. Giuffrida, "InSpectre Gadget: Inspecting the Residual Attack Surface of Cross-privilege Spectre v2," in *USENIX Security*, 2024.
- [13] O. Weisse, J. Van Bulck, M. Minkin, D. Genkin, B. Kasikci, F. Piessens, M. Silberstein, R. Strackx, T. F. Wenisch, and Y. Yarom, "Foreshadow-ng: Breaking the virtual memory abstraction with transient out-of-order execution," 2018.
- [14] M. Larabel, "The brutal performance impact from mitigating the LVI vulnerability," <https://www.phoronix.com/review/lvi-attack-perf>, 2020.
- [15] The Linux kernel development community, "Core scheduling," <https://docs.kernel.org/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html>.
- [16] Kaspersky, "Spectre vulnerability: 4 years after discovery," <https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/spectre-meltdown-in-practice/43525/>, 2022.
- [17] L. Torvalds, "Linus torvalds growing frustrated by buggy hardware, theoretical cpu attacks," <https://linux.slashdot.org/story/24/10/21/1533228/linux-torvalds-growing-frustrated-by-buggy-hardware-theoretical-cpu-attacks>, 2024.
- [18] P. Turner and P. G. Parseghian, "Protecting against the new 'l1tf' speculative vulnerabilities," <https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/gcp/protecting-against-the-new-l1tf-speculative-vulnerabilities>, August 2018.
- [19] L. Torvalds, "Linus torvalds on current meltdown/spectre patches—'somebody is pushing complete garbage for unclear reasons.'," https://www.reddit.com/r/Amd/comments/7s3rnr/linux_torvalds_on_current_meltdownspectre_patches/, 2018.
- [20] —, "Linux kernel mailing list [patch 0/7] ibrs patch series," <https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/4/720>, January 2018.
- [21] B. Toulas, "New apple cpu side-channel attacks steal data from browsers," <https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-apple-cpu-side-channel-attack-steals-data-from-browsers/>.
- [22] R. Lakshmanan, "Researchers expose new intel cpu flaws enabling memory leaks and spectre v2 attacks," <https://thehackernews.com/2025/05/researchers-expose-new-intel-cpu-flaws.html>.
- [23] K. Zetter, "Intel fixes a security flaw it said was repaired six months ago, asks researchers to not reveal flaws despite grace period," *New York Times*, November 2019.
- [24] Manthey, Norbert and Stecklina, Julian and Wiczorkiewicz, Pawel, "XSA-289 - Xen Security Advisories," <https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-289.html>, 2019.
- [25] M. Schwarzl, T. Schuster, M. Schwarz, and D. Gruss, "Speculative Dereferencing of Registers: Reviving Foreshadow," 2021.
- [26] J. Stecklina, "l1tf-demo," <https://github.com/blitz/l1tf-demo>, 2019.
- [27] G. Cloud, "General-purpose machine family for Compute Engine," <https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/machine-resource>.
- [28] AWS, "Amazon EC2 Instance types," <https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types>.
- [29] T. Raymakers, "KVM: x86: use array_index_nospec with indices that come from guest," <https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=c87bd4dd43a624109c3cc42d843138378a7f4548&s=31>, 2025.
- [30] M. Hertogh, E. Vela Nava, D. Quakelaar, and M. Rizzo, "Project Rain:L1TF," <https://bughunters.google.com/blog/4684191115575296/project-rain-l1tf>, September 2025.
- [31] A. Saidi, M. Lipp, and F. Sironi, "Amazon EC2 defenses against L1TF Reloaded," <https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/ec2-defenses-against-l1tf-reloaded>, August 2025.
- [32] Y. Yarom and K. Falkner, "FLUSH+ RELOAD: A high resolution, low noise, L3 cache side-channel attack," in *USENIX Security*, 2014.
- [33] M. Yan, R. Sprabery, B. Gopireddy, C. Fletcher, R. Campbell, and J. Torrellas, "Attack directories, not caches: Side channel attacks in a non-inclusive world," in *IEEE S&P*, 2019.
- [34] C. Percival, "Cache Missing for Fun and Profit," <http://www.daemonology.net/papers/htt.pdf>, 2005.
- [35] D. Gruss, R. Spreitzer, and S. Mangard, "Cache Template Attacks: Automating Attacks on Inclusive Last-Level Caches," in *Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Security Symposium*, ser. SEC '15. USENIX Association, 2015, p. 897–912.
- [36] E. Koruyeh, K. Khasawneh, C. Song, and N. Abu-Ghazaleh, "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks Using the Return Stack Buffer," in *WOOT*, 2018.
- [37] MITRE, "CVE-2018-3639, Spectre Variant 4: Speculative Store Bypass (SSB)," <https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-3639>, 2018.
- [38] M. Schwarz, M. Schwarzl, M. Lipp, J. Masters, and D. Gruss, "NetSpectre: Read arbitrary memory over network," in *ESORICS*, 2019.
- [39] G. Chen, S. Chen, Y. Xiao, Y. Zhang, Z. Lin, and T. Lai, "Sgxpectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves via Speculative Execution," in *EuroS&P*, 2019.
- [40] A. Bhattacharyya, A. Sandulescu, M. Neugschwandtner, A. Sorniotti, B. Falsafi, M. Payer, and A. Kurmus, "SMoTherSpectre: exploiting speculative execution through port contention," in *CCS*, 2019.

- [41] Intel, “L1 terminal fault,” <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/intel-analysis-l1-terminal-fault.html>.
- [42] —, “L1 terminal fault,” <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/l1-terminal-fault.html>.
- [43] Intel, “Affected Processors: Guidance for Security Issues on Intel Processors,” <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html>.
- [44] The Linux kernel development community, “L1D Flushing,” https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.html.
- [45] J. Corbet, “Core scheduling,” <https://lwn.net/Articles/780703/>, 2019.
- [46] C. Canella, J. Van Bulck, M. Schwarz, M. Lipp, B. Von Berg, P. Ortner, F. Piessens, D. Evtushkin, and D. Gruss, “A systematic evaluation of transient execution attacks and defenses,” in *USENIX Security*, 2019, Extended classification tree and PoCs at <https://transient.fail/>.
- [47] Intel, “Microarchitectural Data Sampling (Disclosure Documentation 758366, v3),” <https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/intel-analysis-microarchitectural-data-sampling.html>, 2021.
- [48] M. Schwarz, “PteEditor,” <https://github.com/misc0110/PTEditor>.
- [49] Intel, “Intel. 2023. Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer’s Manual, Combined Volumes: 1, 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D, and 4,” 2023.
- [50] The Linux kernel development community, “Linux Memory Management,” https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.html.
- [51] H. Yavarzadeh, M. Taram, S. Narayan, D. Stefan, and D. Tullsen, “Half&Half: Demystifying Intel’s Directional Branch Predictors for Fast, Secure Partitioned Execution,” in *IEEE S&P*, 2023.
- [52] A. C. Aldaya, B. B. Brumley, S. ul Hassan, C. Pereida García, and N. Tueri, “Port Contention for Fun and Profit,” in *IEEE S&P*, 2019.
- [53] AWS, “The EC2 approach to preventing side-channels,” <https://docs.aws.amazon.com/whitepapers/latest/security-design-of-aws-nitro-system/the-ec2-approach-to-preventing-side-channels.html>.
- [54] J. Zomer and A. Sandulescu, “Finding gadgets for CPU side-channels with static analysis tools,” <https://github.com/google/security-research/blob/master/pocs/cpus/spectre-gadgets/README.md>.
- [55] D. Carpenter, “Smatch check for Spectre stuff,” <https://lwn.net/Articles/752409/>.
- [56] O. Oleksenko, B. Trach, M. Silberstein, and C. Fetzer, “SpecFuzz: Bringing spectre-type vulnerabilities to the surface,” in *USENIX Security*, 2020.
- [57] Z. Qi, Q. Feng, Y. Cheng, M. Yan, P. Li, H. Yin, and T. Wei, “SpecTaint: Speculative Taint Analysis for Discovering Spectre Gadgets,” in *NDSS*, 2021.
- [58] B. Johannesmeyer, J. Koschel, K. Razavi, H. Bos, and C. Giuffrida, “Kasper: scanning for generalized transient execution gadgets in the Linux kernel,” in *NDSS*, 2022.
- [59] M. Pomonis, “KVM: x86: Extend Spectre-v1 mitigation,” <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191211204753.242298-1-pomonis@google.com/>.
- [60] V. P. Kemerlis, M. Polychronakis, and A. D. Keromytis, “ret2dir: Rethinking kernel isolation,” in *USENIX Security*, 2014.
- [61] J. Corbet, “Exclusive page-frame ownership,” <https://lwn.net/Articles/700647/>, 2016.
- [62] —, “Keeping secrets in memfd areas,” <https://lwn.net/Articles/812325>.
- [63] M. Hillenbrand, “Process-local memory allocations for hiding KVM secrets,” <https://lwn.net/Articles/791069/>, 2024.
- [64] H. Xia, D. Zhang, W. Liu, I. Haller, B. Sherwin, and D. Chisnall, “A Secret-Free Hypervisor: Rethinking Isolation in the Age of Speculative Vulnerabilities,” in *IEEE S&P*, 2022.
- [65] A. Chartre and C. Wilk, “Improve Security with Address Space Isolation (ASI),” <https://blogs.oracle.com/linux/post/improve-security-with-address-space-isolation-asi>, 2019.
- [66] J. Shahid, “[RFC PATCH 00/47] Address Space Isolation for KVM,” <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220223052223.1202152-1-junaids@google.com/>, 2022.
- [67] B. Jackman, “[PATCH 00/26] Address Space Isolation (ASI),” <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240712-asi-rfc-24-v1-0-144b319a40d8@google.com/>, 2024.
- [68] M. Hertogh, M. Wiesinger, S. Österlund, M. Muench, N. Amit, H. Bos, and C. Giuffrida, “Quarantine: Mitigating Transient Execution Attacks with Physical Domain Isolation,” in *RAID*, 2023.
- [69] D. Moghimi, “Downfall: Exploiting speculative data gathering,” in *32nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 23)*, 2023, pp. 7179–7193.
- [70] O. Oleksenko, F. Solt, C. Fournet, J. Hofmann, B. Köpf, and S. Volos, “Enter, exit, page fault, leak: Testing isolation boundaries for microarchitectural leaks,” in *2026 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, May 2026.
- [71] L. Trampert, C. Rossow, and M. Schwarz, “Browser-Based CPU Fingerprinting,” in *ESORICS*, 2022.
- [72] T. Saito, K. Yasuda, K. Tanabe, and K. Takahashi, “Web Browser Tampering: Inspecting CPU Features from Side-Channel Information,” in *Broadband and Wireless Computing, Communication and Applications*, 2017.
- [73] A. Mambretti, P. Convertini, A. Sorniotti, A. Sandulescu, E. Kirda, and A. Kurmus, “GhostBuster: understanding and overcoming the pitfalls of transient execution vulnerability checkers,” in *SANER*, 2021.
- [74] S. Lesimple, “spectre-meltdown-checker,” <https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker>.
- [75] VUSec, “mdstool-cli,” <https://github.com/vusec/ridl>.
- [76] A. Mambretti, M. Neugschwandtner, A. Sorniotti, E. Kirda, W. Robertson, and A. Kurmus, “Speculator: a tool to analyze speculative execution attacks and mitigations,” in *ACSAC*, 2019.
- [77] M. S. Brunella, G. Bianchi, S. Turco, F. Quaglia, and N. Blefari-Melazzi, “Foreshadow-VMM: Feasibility and Network Perspective,” in *IEEE NetSoft*, 2019.
- [78] P. Turner, “Retpoline: A Software Construct for Preventing Branch-Target-Injection,” <https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886>, 2018.

12. Meta-Review

The following meta-review was prepared by the program committee for the 2026 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) as part of the review process as detailed in the call for papers.

12.1. Summary

The authors demonstrate that transient-execution exploits are practical in the cloud under real-world, noisy conditions. They showed that combining two vulnerabilities, which were mitigated in isolation, enabled exploitation when used together. This enabled them to conduct end-to-end attacks that extract data from both Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services.

12.2. Scientific Contributions

- Identifies an Impactful Vulnerability
- Provides a Valuable Step Forward in an Established Field

12.3. Reasons for Acceptance

- 1) The paper identifies an impactful vulnerability. While neither of the two primitives they combined (L1TF and a speculative out-of-bounds load) are novel by themselves, when used together they bypass mitigations currently deployed in real cloud infrastructure. This enable a guest VM to read sensitive data from both co-tenants and the hypervisor.
- 2) The paper provides a valuable step forward in an established field. Many prior works have demonstrated transient execution attacks only in lab settings with minimal noise. By demonstrating end-to-end attacks against a cloud setup with many processes generating a huge amount of noise through heavy memory pressure and IO operations, the authors prove that transient-execution attacks are in fact feasible in realistic cloud settings.

12.4. Noteworthy Concerns

The paper leverages a vulnerability only open to old CPUs (namely L1TF) and, as such, its results only directly apply to limited scenarios. While there are vulnerabilities in newer CPUs, and it is possible that they may be exploitable in clouds, this work's focus on older CPUs and vulnerabilities raises doubts about generalization.